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1Abstract
Using unique data on criminal proﬁles of 800 US Maﬁa members active in the 50s
and 60s and on their connections within the Cosa Nostra network we analyze how
the geometry of criminal ties between mobsters depends on family ties, community
roots and ties, legal and illegal activities. We contrast our evidence with historical
and sociological views about the functioning of the Maﬁa. Much of our ﬁndings are
remarkably in line with these views, with interesting qualiﬁcations. We interpret
some of our results in light of a model of optimal vertical and horizontal connections
where more connections mean more proﬁts but also a higher risk of defection. We
ﬁnd that variables that lower the risk of defection, among others, kinship, violence,
and maﬁa culture increase the number of connections. Moreover, there is evidence
of strategic endogamy: female children are as valuable as male ones, and being
married to a “connected” wife is a strong predictor of leadership within the Maﬁa
ranks. A very parsimonious regression model explains one third of the variability
in the criminal ranking of the “men of honor,” suggesting that these variables could
be used to detect criminal leaders. An additional prediction of our simple model
is a right-skewed distribution of the number of connections, which is remarkably in
line with the evidence of an extremely hierarchical organization.
Keywords: Maﬁa, Networks, Intermarriage, Assortative Matching, Crime.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: A14, C21, D23, D85, K42, Z131 Introduction
Despite more than 40 years of law enforcement’s success in the ﬁght against organized
crime, according to the FBI1, in 2005 there were 651 pending investigations related to the
Italian Maﬁa in the U.S.; almost 1,500 mobsters were arrested, and 824 were convicted;
of the roughly 1,000 “made” members of Italian organized crime groups estimated to
be active in the U.S., 200 were in jail. In addition, the Italian Maﬁa doesn’t anymore
hold the monopoly of racketeering. With the end of the Cold War and the advent of
globalization “transnational” organized crime organization are on the rise, mainly the
Russian Maﬁa, the African enterprises, the Chinese tongs, South American drug cartels,
the Japanese Yakuza, and the, so called, Balkan Organized Crime groups, and their
proceeds, by the most conservative estimates, comprise around 5 percent of the world’s
GDP (Schneider and Enste, 2000, Wagley, 2006).
Notwithstanding such numbers, the illicit nature of organized crime activities has
precluded quantitative analysis and the literature has overwhelmingly been anecdotal or
theoretical (Reuter, 1994). Indeed, this is the ﬁrst study that uses extensive individual
level data to describe the hierarchy of such organizations.2 We use criminal records for
more than 800 criminals–Figure 1 shows record number one—-based on an exact facsimile
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) secret ﬁles on American Maﬁa members that
were active and alive in 1960 (MAF, 2007) to analyze criminal connections and hierarchies,
ranking mobsters based on the number and the quality of their connections.3 A possible
policy purpose is to learn about organizational rules of the Maﬁa and to identify the “key
players.”
1The source is www.fbi.gov.
2A rare exception is Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) who use detailed ﬁnancial activities of a drug-selling
street gang to analyze gang behavior.
3At the end of the 50s the FBN, that later merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control to form
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was the main authority in the ﬁght against the Maﬁa
(Critchley, 2009). In New York the FBI had just four agents, mainly working in oﬃce, assigned to the
area, while in the same oﬃce more than 400 agents were ﬁghting domestic communists (Maas, 1968).
3We use several measures on how central members are within the network. A mobster
might exert power because he is largely connected, or because he has few connections
but these are to high caliber ﬁgures like Lucky Luciano, Frank Costello, or Joe Bonanno.
Mobsters might also be central because they represent bridges that connect diﬀerent
clusters of a network. The geometry of Maﬁa connections is crucial for understanding
the activity of the Cosa Nostra, “Our Thing,” as these connections are the building block
of the entire Maﬁa, and more generally of organized crime, even today. Valachi’s 1962
testimony and documents found during the 2007 arrest of Salvatore Lo Piccolo, a Sicilian
Maﬁa boss, show that the ﬁrst rule in the Maﬁa decalogue stays unchallenged: “No one
can present himself directly to another of our friends. There must be a third person to do
it” (Maas, 1968). Connections are thus necessary for a criminal career within the Maﬁa.
Moreover, leadership positions cannot be simply inherited; soldiers elect their boss using
secret ballots (Falcone and Padovani, 1991, pg. 101).
Francisco Costiglia, alias Frank Costello, a Maﬁa bosses who in our data is connected
to 34 mobsters, would say “he is connected” to describe someone’s aﬃliation to the Maﬁa
(Wolf and DiMona, 1974). In 1970 the Organized Crime Control Act deﬁned organized
crime as “The unlawful activities of ... a highly organized, disciplined association....” The
purpose of our research is to describe these associations and their organizational structure.
The structure has its roots in a world characterized by the absence of legally enforceable
contracts. These criminals need to trust each other, and the purpose of this study is
to understand how and where this trust emerges. To the best of our knowledge no one
has used network analysis tools on such a detailed set of information on individual Maﬁa
members to study the emergence of networks: ranging from their business to their family
structure.
Guided by a simple model of connections we try to shed light on several predictions
about how these networks and the related hierarchies emerge. We evaluate the relative
4importance of legal and illegal businesses, family ties, and community ties in shaping
these networks, contrasting the economic with the social view of Cosa Nostra.
Criminals might be more likely to be associated with criminals who establish similar
illegal businesses if they try to build cartels. Or they might try to diversify the risk
of detection keeping a lower proﬁle and thus associate themselves with criminals who
operate diﬀerent kinds of businesses. Carefully chosen marriages might help to establish
robust criminal ties. Children might thus be important too, both because of this strategic
endogamy, and because male descendants represent trusted potential associates.4 5 Based
on a participant observation study for a New York based Italian American crime family
Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972) discuss the importance of family lineage, intermarriage, and
kinship.
As in the great Maﬁa families of Sicily, the “descendants” intermarry con-
tinuously, for the clan deﬁnes who may or may not marry whom. As in
clans everywhere, the relationship between the intermarrying pair is deﬁned
as strengthening the social structure. (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972, pg. 192)
These marriages would thus have the same function as alliances among European royalty:
providing new protectors.
Another way children or, more generally, relatives might increase the trust toward a
member is because they represent potential targets for retaliatory action. Trust, or bet-
ter, blind obedience, and the vow of silence, called omert` a, are indeed essential for the
Maﬁa clans’ survival. Maﬁa clans, called “Families” (as in Bonanno (1983) we use upper-
case to distinguish them from the nuclear family) represent societies where social capital
produces public “bads” (Portes, 1998). A Family protects its members and guarantees
4Information on the number of male and female children, and on the maiden name of the wife is going
to allow us to verify the strategic endogamy theory and to evaluate the importance of descendants.
5Another instrument for building bonds is the “comparatico,” a spiritual parentage a la “The
Godfather.” Unfortunately the data do not contain information about these kind of links
(Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972).
5their monopoly power in exchange of part of their revenues. Large clans will therefore be
more powerful but also more exposed. A simple model of sequential “dictatorial” network
formation by a Maﬁa boss formalizes this tradeoﬀ and guides our empirical strategy.
Some of the economic insights are present in early theoretical analysis of criminal be-
havior. But most studies have focused on a market structure view of organized crime,
where the Maﬁa generates monopoly power in legal (for a fee) and illegal markets. Among
others, such view is present in the collection of papers in Fiorentini and Peltzman (1997),
and in Reuter (1983), Abadinsky (1990), Gambetta (1996), and Kumar and Skaperdas
(2009). Only two theoretical papers have focused on the internal organization of orga-
nized crime groups. Garoupa (2007) looks at the optimal size of these organizations,
while Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008) looks at the optimal internal structure (cells versus
hierarchies). We borrow some of their insights, mainly that larger organizations are more
proﬁtable but also more vulnerable.
Our work is also related to the growing literature on trust, family values, and family
businesses. Guiso et al. (2006) present an introduction to the importance of culture,
deﬁned as “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit
fairly unchanged from generation to generation,” on economic behavior. We will argue
that for criminal behavior the same applies. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) present a macro-
type analysis about the importance of family values for economic growth, and conclude
writing that more research is need to understand how family values shape the organization
of businesses and their eﬃciency.
Sparrow (1991) proposes the use of network analysis to study criminal networks, but
only Morselli (2003) followed Sparrow’s proposal, and only based on a single New York
based family, the Gambino one. Recent papers on social networks show that the indi-
vidual position within a network is indeed crucial in explaining the individual level of
activity (Ballester et al., 2006). If individual decisions are somehow connected to the
6structure of social contacts each individual chooses (or is trapped in), understanding the
formation of network structure is crucial for anti-crime policies. Given the complexity
of social relationship, evidence documenting patterns of association between agents is a
ﬁrst priority as it can also inform the theoretical literature looking at network formation
processes. Several models of network formation have recently been proposed. Most rely
on some forms of pairwise regressions, but are based on strong assumptions (see, for ex-
ample, Bramoull´ e and Fortin, 2010). We focus more on the elements that are related to
the centrality of mobsters than on those that determine single connections.
In this paper, we contribute to this strand of empirical literature on networks. We
use social networks analysis tools to map the social ties of criminals in the US Maﬁa. To
what extend is the Maﬁa a randomly generated network? Do criminals connect to other
criminals that are similar to them, and similar with respect to what? What characteristics
contribute to the formation of a leaders, key players, i.e. the most central agents in the
network? What kind of network formation can rationalize our ﬁndings?
We also hope that the U.S. experience with Cosa Nostra and this wealth of information
may oﬀer clues to promising control techniques in countries where organized crime is on
the rise (Jacobs and Gouldin, 1999).
2 The Origin of American Maﬁa
Before presenting our empirical study it is important to contextualize this study. We do
this proving some background about when these “made” men came to the U.S. and how
the Maﬁa operated in the 1960s when the FBN was ﬁling the records we analyze.
Historians deﬁne two waves of immigration from Sicily, before and after World War I
(WWI). Before WWI immigrants were mainly driven by economic needs. Several Maﬁa
bosses, like Lucky Luciano, Tommaso Lucchese, Vito Genovese, Frank Costello, etc, were
children of these early immigrants. Even though between 1901 and 1913 almost a quarter
7of Sicily’s population departed for America, many of these early immigrant families were
not from Sicily. During those years around 2 million Italians, mainly from the south
emigrated to the U.S. (Critchley, 2009). These baby immigrants later became street gang
members in the slums; they spoke little Italian, and worked side by side with criminals
from other ethnicities, mainly Jews and Irish (Lupo, 2009).
Lured by the criminal successes of the ﬁrst wave of immigrants, and, quite paradox-
ically, facilitated by prohibitionism, the second wave of immigrants that later became
Maﬁa bosses were already criminals by the time they entered the U.S.. Charles Gambino,
Joe Profaci, Joe Bonanno, and others were in their 20s and 30s when they ﬁrst entered
the U.S., and they were all coming from Sicily.6 Another reason for this selection of im-
migrants was the fascist crack-down of the Maﬁa, which forced some of these criminals to
leave Sicily. After the second wave of immigration the Maﬁa became more closely linked
to the Sicilian Maﬁa and started adopting its code of honor and its tradition.7
In 1930 and 1931 these new arrivals led to a Maﬁa war, called the Castellamare war,
named after a small city in Sicily where many of the new Maﬁa bosses were coming
from. The war lasted until Maranzano, who was trying to become the “Boss of the
Bosses,” was probably killed by Lucky Luciano, who had joined the Masseria Family.8
This war put Lucky Luciano at the top of the Maﬁa organization but led also to a
reaction by the media and by the prosecutors. In 1936 Thomas E. Dewey, appointed New
York City special prosecutor to crack down on the rackets, managed to obtain Luciano’s
conviction with charges on multiple counts of compulsory prostitution. Luciano served
only 10 years of the 30 to 50 years sentenced. In 1946 thanks to an alleged involvement
in the Allied troops’ landing in Sicily he was deported to Italy, from where he tried to
6Bandiera (2003) analyzes the origins of the Sicilian Maﬁa, highlighting how land fragmentation,
missing rule of law, and predatory attacks generated demand for private protection.
7See Gosch and Hammer (1975)
8Previously, in order to end the power-struggle between Masseria and Maranzano Lucky Luciano had
oﬀered to eliminate Joe “the Boss” Masseria, which he did at an Italian restaurant, feeding him with
lead.
8keep on organizing “the organization.” Between 1950 and 1951, the Kefauver Committee,
oﬃcially the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce, had
a profound impact on the American public. It was the ﬁrst committee organized to gain a
better understanding of how to ﬁght organized crime, and the main source of information
was a list of 800 suspected criminals submitted by FBN’s Commissioner Anslinger, most
likely an early version of our records (McWilliams, 1990, pg. 141). But the Committee
could not prove the existence of a Maﬁa.
After Luciano’s expatriation several other Families headed the organization: Costello,
Profaci, Bonanno, and Gambino. Family ties were of uttermost importance. According to
Bonanno’s autobiography (Bonanno, 1983), he became the Boss of the Bosses in part by
organizing in 1956 the marriage between his son Bill and the daughter of Profaci, Rosalia.
In 1957 Gambino took over the leadership.
Throughout the 1950s the FBN continued to investigate the Maﬁa, but until in 1957
an unexpected event happened the Maﬁa was not under Media’s attention. The event
was the lucky raid of an American Maﬁa summit, the “Apalachin meeting.” Police raided
the meeting and over 60 underworld bosses were detained. Joe Bonanno managed to ﬂee,
and was later known as Joe “Bananas.” After that meeting everybody had to agree with
the FBN’s view that there was one big, and well organized Maﬁa. This meant probably
the beginning of the end of the American Maﬁa. Robert Kennedy, attorney general of
the United States, and even J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions, joined Harry J. Anslinger, the U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics, in his war against
the mob. The same years a permanent Senate Select Committee was formed, the Mc-
Clellan commission. Anslinger’s FBN conducted the investigative work and coordinated
nationwide arrests of Apalachin defendants.
Lucky Luciano died of a heart attack at the airport of Naples in 1962. In the 50s and
60s Cosa Nostra was governed by a Commissione of from 7 to 12 bosses, which also acted
9as the ﬁnal arbiter on disputes between Families. The remaining 10 to 15 families were
smaller and not part of Cosa Nostra’s governing body. The total estimated number of
members was around 5,000 (Maas, 1968). The 800 proﬁles that we have access to thus
do not cover all members, but certainly the most important ones.
After learning that had been marked for execution Joe Valachi became the ﬁrst and
most important informer for the FBN and later the FBI starting in 1962,9 and revealed
that the Cosa Nostra was made of approximately 25 Families. Each Family was structured
in hierarchies with a boss, Capo Famiglia, at the top, a second in command, called under-
boss, Sottocapo, a counselor, Consigliere, and several capo, Caporegime, captains who head
a group of soldiers (regime) (Maas, 1968). Figure 2 shows how in 1963, thanks to Valachi’s
testimony, a U.S. Senate commission set up to investigate organized crime, called the Mc-
Clellan commission, drew the Bonanno Family “tree” structure. And Valachi provided
information on many more families. Since our data represents a snapshot of what the
authorities knew in 1960 they do not contain information about the Family each member
belongs to. Nevertheless, we’ll see that the pattern of connections is clearly informative
about the structure of Cosa Nostra. Joe Valachi’s testimony conﬁrmed the FBN’s view
(which at the time wasn’t the FBI’s one) that the Maﬁa had a pyramidal structure with
connections leading toward every single member (in our data almost the whole network
is connected and the average path length is just 3.7).
3 Murder Incorporated
The Maﬁa, and more generally networks of criminals or gangs have tremendous inﬂuence
on crime. They amplify delinquent behavior. In the sociological literature, this is referred
as the social facilitation model, where gang members are intrinsically no diﬀerent from
9Jacobs and Gouldin (1999) provide a relatively short overview about law enforcement’s unprecedented
attack on Italian organized crime families following Valachi’s hearings.
10no-gang members in terms of delinquency propensity. If they do join a gang, however, the
normative structure and group processes of the gang (network) are likely to bring about
higher rates of delinquency. Gang membership is thus viewed as a major cause of deviant
behavior (see, e.g. Thornberry et al., 1993).10 Moreover, crimes like racketeering, drug
traﬃcking, gambling, bootlegging, etc require a group to be properly “organized.”11
Empirical evidence on the relationship between crime and typically unobserved crim-
inal organizations is, however, scarce, to say the least. The information provided in our
data allows us to collect evidence on the presence of Cosa Nostra across cities. We inves-
tigate to what extent the presence and the density of the Maﬁa is correlated with local
levels of violent (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) and non-violent (burglary, larceny,
and auto theft) crimes. Crime rates are based on city-level uniform crime reports.12. Ta-
ble 1 shows that the cities included in our data set, i.e. those where the Maﬁa operates,
(“Maﬁa cities,” hereafter) are the US cities where more violent crimes are committed.
The variance of these crimes are higher in Maﬁa cities which is indicative of the modus
operandi of the Maﬁa organization where periods of relative “peace” among diﬀerent fam-
ilies alternate with “Maﬁa wars,” with peak crime levels. Most of these cities are also
cited by Valachi to be the ones where Families were active (Maas, 1968).
Among the Maﬁa cities the top panels of Figure 3 shows the raw correlation between
the number of Maﬁa members per 100,000 inhabitants and local levels of violent and
non-violent crimes, and in the bottom panel the one between the Maﬁa network structure
and again violent and non-violent crimes. The network structure is measured by the
average eigenvector centrality of the Maﬁa members that live in the city.13 It appears
10In his very inﬂuential theory of diﬀerential associations, (Sutherland, 1947) emphasizes that the role
of gangs is to facilitate the learning of crime technology.
11See Alexander (1997) for an economic analysis of racketeering with collusion.
12We use the same data constructed by Levitt (1997), which consist of a panel of roughly 60 US cities,
with observations running from 1970 to 1992. The data are freely downloadable from the Internet at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/replications/mccrary/index.html
13The eigenvector centrality index assigns larger scores to nodes that are linked to high-scoring nodes
than to nodes that are linked to low-scoring nodes. In appendix B we discuss this index in more detail.
Google’s page rank is a variant of the eigenvector centrality index (Bonacich, 1987).
11that while the estimated correlations between Maﬁa indicators and crimes are only mild
for non-violent crimes, they are clearly strong and positive for violent crimes.
Even though we are comparing the presence of the Maﬁa in 1960 with the average
crime levels between 1970 and 1992, with persistent crime rates such correlation would
also emerge if Families would systematically choose to reside in cities that were more
appropriate for racketeering and that happened to have higher crime rates. In Figure 4 we
address the selection issue plotting the city ﬁxed eﬀects within a typical crime regression
that controls for standard determinants of the local crime rates (including income per
capita and growth, police force, percentage of blacks, government spending in education
and welfare, population age structure) on the presence and the density of the Maﬁa. The
positive correlation between the Maﬁa structure and violent crime rates persists, while
non-violent crimes do not seem to be positively related to the Maﬁa.
While we cannot claim that selection is not part of the story, it is unlikely to be
the only part. Cracking down on Maﬁa and its violent culture is likely to lower violent
crime rates. This happened in the US once the government started to severely prosecute
mobsters, and might still happen in the Southern parts of Italy where the Maﬁa is still
very active. We claim that analyzing the network within Cosa Nostra helps prosecutors
to understand how Cosa Nostra works and how to best ﬁght it.
4 Descriptive Evidence About Cosa Nostra and Its
Members
4.1 The FBN Records
The criminal ﬁles come from an exact facsimile of a huge Federal Bureau of Narcotics
report of which ﬁfty copies were circulated within the Bureau starting in the 1950s. These
ﬁles come from more than 20 years of investigations, and several successful inﬁltrations
12by undercover agents (McWilliams, 1990). Given that in the U.S. there were an estimated
5,000 members active during those years the list represents a certainly non-random sample
of Cosa Nostra members. More active and more connected mobsters were certainly more
likely to be noticed and tracked, which is probably why most, if not all, big bosses that
were alive at the time have a ﬁle. Later we will address how a random and a non-random
selection inﬂuence our analyses.
4.2 Individual Characteristics of the Members
Before analyzing how criminals are connected within the Maﬁa it is instructive to describe
the members based on the information contained in the criminal records. Let us ﬁrst date
the data. Given that the distribution of the year of ﬁrst arrest has basically full support
within the range 1908-1960 (the only year without a ﬁrst arrest is 1910) one can infer
that the data refer to what the authorities knew in 1960.14 The records do not report any
death, thus don’t include big bosses that were killed before 1960, i.e. Albert Anastasia
boss of one of the 5 New York City families, the Gambino one.15
Table 2 shows that the average year of birth is 1911, thus the average age is 49 years.
The youngest member is 23 years old, while the oldest one is 60. Half of the mobsters
reside in either New York, or in New Jersey, and probably entered the U.S. through Ellis
Island. Indeed, 29 percent were born in Sicily and another 10 percent in other regions
of Italy. Most remaining mobsters were born in the United States but were of Italian
origin as it represented a prerequisite to become a member. 75 percent of members are
married, but only 60 percent of these are reported to have children (0.44/0.75). The
overall average number of children is 1 and is 2.14 among members with children, equally
divided between sons and daughters. 18 percent of members are married to someone who
14Additional evidence is the following description in Michael Russo’s ﬁle: “Recently (1960) perjured
himself before a Grand Jury in an attempt to protect another Maﬁa member and narcotic traﬃcker.”
15His brother Anthony “Tough Tony,” instead, was killed in 1963 and is in our records.
13shares her maiden name with some other member (Connected wife). These marriages
are presumably endogamous within the Maﬁa. Observe that we are understating the
percentage of marriages within the Maﬁa as some Maﬁa surnames might be missing in
our data.16 The FBN reports an average of 1.96 siblings per member, while the average
number of recorded members that share the same surname is 1.62.
The average height is 5.6 feet, the average weight is 176 pounds.17 Their criminal
career starts early. They are on average 23 years old when they end up in jail for the ﬁrst
time, and the majority has committed some violent crime. Only 16 percent do not have
an arrest record. We don’t know the total number of crimes committed by the mobsters
but we know in how many diﬀerent types of crime they have apparently been involved.
This number varies between 0 and 9 and the average is 2.58. We also know in how many
diﬀerent legal businesses they have interest in. This number varies between 0 and 5 and
is on average equal to 1.
Tables 3 and 4 show the list of legal and illegal activities that at least 5 percent of
members were involved in. Most mobsters owned restaurants, drugstores or were other-
wise involved with the supply of food. Real estate, casinos, car dealerships, and import
export were also common businesses. Among the illegal activities the most common one
is drug traﬃcking (43 percent), maybe also because the information was gathered by the
FBN. Twenty-six percent of members were involved in robberies and 23 percent in mur-
ders. Weapon oﬀences and assaults are also quite common. Overall, several members are
involved in violent crimes which is in line with the correlations between Maﬁa density
and violent crimes presented in Section 3. Some crimes that are typically associated with
organized crime, like gambling, extortions, and liquor oﬀences (during prohibition) are
highly represented as well.
16While it is also possible that some women might have a Maﬁa surname without being linked to any
Maﬁa family, this is very unlikely conditional on being married to a Maﬁa associate.
17As a note, 18 percent of the mobsters are obese and 58 percent overweight.
144.3 Individual Characteristics in Relationship to the Network
Each criminal record contains a list of criminal associates. Figure 1 shows, for example,
that Joe Bonanno was associated with Luciano, Costello, Profaci, Corallo, Lucchese, and
Galante. There is no evidence about how the FBN established such associations, and
why they were restricted to be 5. Undirected connections are clearly more numerous, as
mobsters can be listed as associates in several records. Hence, we deﬁne two mobsters
to be connected whenever at least one mobster lists the other mobster’s last name in his
record.18
Table 5 shows the list of members with the 10 highest and 10 lowest number of di-
rect connections.19 The FBN records contain for each mobster a paragraph about the
mobster’s activities within Cosa Nostra. In order to extract information on the level of
importance of these criminals the variable Top counts the number of times the words
“boss,” “highest,” “most,” “head,” and “top” are cited and High the number of times
“high,” “inﬂuential,” “important,” “leader,” “leading,” “powerful,” and “representing”
are cited. The Apalachin variable indicates whether the mobster attended the important
1957 Maﬁa meeting in the Upstate New York. The last column represents the historically
reconstructed position within the Maﬁa.
Criminals with many connections are more likely to be recognized as high-ranked
members, and more likely to have attended the 1957 meeting. Several members in the top
distribution of the number of connections are bosses, i.e. Salvatore Lucania, alias Lucky
Luciano, Vito Genovese, Antoni Accardo, Joe and Joseph Profaci. Salvatore Santoro and
Salvatore Vitale were instead underbosses of the Lucchese and Bonanno Family. Criminals
with the lowest degrees, instead, are mostly soldiers.
The number of connections, called degree in network analysis, are thus one way to mea-
18In other words, we construct a symmetric adjacency matrix of undirected connections.
19Since connection are based on surnames members with the same surname will share the same
degree. This introduces some noise but dealing with the large variation in ﬁrst names, i.e. Anto-
nio/Tony/Anthony, would introduce even more noise in graphing the network.
15sure the importance of members, but over the past years social network theorists have
proposed diﬀerent centrality measures to account for the variability in network location
across agents and there is not a systematic criterium to pick up the “right” centrality mea-
sure for each particular situation (Borgatti, 2003, Wasserman and Faust, 1994).20 Before
showing the distribution of some of these measures we brieﬂy deﬁne them (see Appendix
B for a more technical deﬁnition). Unlike degree, which weights every contact equally, the
eigenvector index weights contacts according to their centralities. The index takes direct
as well as indirect connections and thus the whole network into account.21 The closeness
index represents the inverse of the average distance between a node (a member) and all
the other nodes, and is a good measure for how isolated members are. The betweenness
index measure the number of times a node is on the shortest path between two randomly
chosen nodes, and is a good measure for how the member’s capacity to act like a bridge
between clusters of members.
These measures of individual centrality allow us to consider diﬀerent nuances in the
deﬁnition of a Maﬁa leader. Our data also allow us to construct a qualitative indicator of
importance, based on the union of the Top and High variables discussed in this section.
Table 6 collects descriptive statistics about our various indicators of importance.22 The
non-standardized degree varies between 1 and 71, and Figure 5 shows that the corre-
sponding density is positively skewed. The eigenvector index (centrality) has a density
that is very similar to the one of degree, while the one of closeness is more symmetrically
distributed, meaning that most mobsters are neither too isolated nor too close within the
network. The density of betweenness, instead, shows that very few mobsters represents
bridges between subsets of the network, most likely Families. Finally, ﬁfty-ﬁve percent of
the mobsters appear to be high-ranked, meaning that their descriptions includes at least
20See also Sparrow (1991) for a discussion on centrality indices in criminal networks.
21As ﬁrstly noted by Granovetter (1973), weak ties (i.e. friends of friends) are important source of
information. See Patacchini and Zenou (2008) for the role of weak ties in explaining criminal activities.
22Our individual centrality measures have been normalized such that the maximum values are equal
to 100.
16a word that implies leadership.
The last variable to be summarized in Table 6 is the interaction index. The index
measures the exposure to what Bonanno (1983) calls, in uppercase, “Tradition” or Hess
(1973) calls, in lowercase, “maﬁa,” or “maﬁa culture” to distinguish it from “Maﬁa” the
organization. Figure 6 helps us explain the index. It shows the current distribution at
the zip code level of the members’ surnames in Italy’s phone directory.23 Each circle is
proportional to the number of surnames present within each zip code. Not surprisingly
many surnames show up in Sicily, in Naples, and in Calabria. Many of these surnames
appear also in large cities that were subject to immigratory ﬂows from the south, like
Milan, Rome, and Turin. For each members’ surname we computed the probability that
it shares a randomly chosen zip code located in the South of Italy with other surnames
from the list. To be more precise, the index for member i is equal to 100,000 times the
sum across zip codes j of the fraction of surnames of member i present in zip codes j









The advantage of this index is that we can computed it for all surnames while information
about the Italian community of origin would only be available for those born in Italy. The
average index is equal to 3.7 per 100,000. Ten percent of the times the index is zero, either
because the zip codes do not overlap or because the surname is not in the phone directory.
4.3.1 Characteristics of the Maﬁa Network
As pointed out by Jackson and Rogers (2007), the distribution of degree in a socially
generated network is more unequal than in random networks. We start our empirical
investigation by providing some evidence on the extent to which such empirical regularity
23Unfortunately we could not ﬁnd the distribution of surnames in 1960.
17ﬁnd support in our real world network.
In random networks the log-frequency is linear in log-degree. Figure 7 shows that this
is not true for the Maﬁa network. Links are not random. The interesting question is then:
what are the forces shaping the associations between criminals? Are criminals more likely
to be associated with criminals who established similar illegal businesses or do they prefer
to diversify the risk of detection keeping a lower proﬁle and thus associate themselves
with criminals who operate diﬀerent kinds of businesses?
Our data show that criminals tend, indeed, to associate with like-types both in illegal
and legal activities. Table 7 shows the extent to which criminals associate with other
criminals in similar kind of business, in illegal and legal activities. The tables show
positive and signiﬁcant correlation, called assortativity, for almost all crimes and legal
businesses detailed in our data.
Given the non-randomness of the Cosa Nostra network, before moving to the empirical
analysis of the determinants of the network structure we develop, based on historical
accounts, a simple model of Maﬁa connections. The aim of the model is to show how a
simple model of connections can generate a positively skewed distribution of degree and
some interesting comparative static results.
5 A Simple Model of Connections
In this Section we develop a simple model of hierarchical connections.24 The boss or
equivalently the Family decides the optimal number of soldiers (s) and captains (c),
the intermediaries who lead a group of soldiers. The boss or the captains do not face
restrictions on the supply of subordinates, as there is evidence of excess-supply of low ranks
(Maas, 1968). The total (reduced form) beneﬁts of the whole organization,
R t
0 ur (s,c)dr,
depend on the number of diﬀerent Families that are active (t). Given that the period
24See Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008) for a game-theoretical model that rationalizes hierarchies.
18between the Castellamare war (1929-1931) and 1960 was a relatively peaceful time inside
Cosa Nostra, with an established Commissione that was resolving the disputes Families
had between them, we do not model competition or war with other Families (Lupo,
2009). Moreover, after wiping out competing gangs, mainly the Irish and the Jewish
ones, the Italian Maﬁa had gained complete control of racketeering. During those years
the Maﬁa was behaving like a stable cartel, with self-enforcing strict rules to keep the
cartel running: markets were geographically segmented; Family memberships were held
stable to keep relative power unchanged; the status quo of leadership within Families was
endorsed and insurrections were repressed collectively (Bonanno, 1983). We also do not
model the choice of the underboss as in Bonanno (1983)’s words “he is just a ﬁgurehead
who represents the Family on various family matters.”
The Commissione decides its optimal size t depending on its ability to keep the Fami-
lies united. Each Family represents a new tree of connections for which the Commissione
he has to pay a constant cost γ. The total utility v(·) depends of the diﬀerence between

























s.t. γ > 1,s > 0,c > 0
Assuming, without loss of generality, symmetry across Families, u(·) = ur(·), the ﬁrst




∗)] − γ = 0
19where s∗ and c∗ represent the optimal choices in the number of soldiers and captains (see
Falcone and Padovani (1991, pg. 99) for a discussion about soldiers who are under direct
control of their boss). If the marginal beneﬁts are decreasing in t, i.e. because of increased
complexity, a Commissione with larger marginal costs would also have fewer members.
To solve for the optimal number of soldiers and captains we maximize the beneﬁts of each
tree, argmaxs,cv(u(s,c)) = argmaxs,cu(s,c).
We specify the following functional form for the expected beneﬁts of a tree c:
u(s,c) = (s + ck(1 − τ)q
ck)p
s. (2)
Given that “(T)he size of the group varies depending on group leader’s following,”
we assume that size to be ﬁxed and equal to k (Bonanno, 1983). The number k, and
in general the tree developing under a captain could just be modeled in the same way




where qs represents the probability of success of the captain’s business with s soldiers
when each soldier generates a payoﬀ of 1.
The rationale is that when a soldier with direct connections to the boss gets caught
the boss might loose the entire business. This happens with probability 1−p. Thus with
probability ps he keeps the proﬁts of the entire business tree if s soldiers work directly
for him. Bonanno (1983) presents a perfect example of such a trade-oﬀ. In 1931, after
Lucky Luciano’s killing of Maranzano, Joe Bonanno, the new boss of the Castellamare
faction in Brooklyn, was oﬀered to directly participate in Lucky Luciano’s stake in the
NYC clothing industry. But he overcame his “temptation-that of making money easily
20but heedlessly” in order to avoid “a practice with a high risk of discovery.” “Unlike Charlie
Lucky” he wanted to keep his “name clean and out of the public eye.”25
Bosses might, therefore, prefer to delegate parts of the business to captains. The
probability the captain’s business survives, thus none of his soldiers gets caught and no
investigation is successful, is qck. If the captain’s business gets disrupted this does not
spill over to the boss. This insulating mechanism that develops makes prosection of bosses
extremely diﬃcult (Critchley, 2009)26
The proﬁts are a linear function of the number of soldiers s and a linear function of the
number of captains c. But in accordance with the actual workings of the Maﬁa captains
keep a fraction τ of the proﬁts ck, which are proportional to the number of soldiers they
employ k (Raab, 2006, pg.5). Business is structured like a franchised company, where in
exchange of τ bosses provide protection.
From the ﬁrst order conditions (shown in the appendix) one can show that the optimal
















25See Reuter (1985) for a discussion about the optimal size of criminal organization and, more generally,
about providing incentives for loyalty.
26During Joe Valachi initiation rite boss Maranzano explained that if a soldier has to see his boss he
has to ask his captain ﬁrst. “A soldier ain’t allowed to go running all the times to his boss” (Maas, 1968).


















































































The results are intuitive and would hardly change if we made the model more compli-
cated, i.e. introducing a competitive labor market for aﬃliates, or a competitive environ-
ment between Families.
The number of direct soldiers increase with the probability of success p, with the “tax”
paid to captains, and go down with the probability of success of captains q. The number
of captains, instead, does not depend on the probability of success of soldiers p, but does
depend positively on their own probability of success and negatively on the number of
their crew.
Given the closed form solutions for s∗ and c∗ one can easily simulate the distribution
of total connections of the boss, s + c, for diﬀerent levels of p and q. Figure 8 shows
that even if we draw p and q from a uniform distribution the model does not predict a
22uniform distribution of connections, but rather a positively skewed one, for both soldiers
and captains. This particular shape does not depend on τ, or on the range of p and q, or
on their diﬀerence.
The number of aﬃliates depends on the boss’s p and q, the ability to prevent soldiers
and captains to become informers for the FBI or the FBN. What do these abilities depend
on? Fear of retaliation for breaking the vow of silence, called omert` a, has certainly been
a key factor for the success of the Cosa Nostra. Some members were well known for the
violence, their bloodshedding attitude, among these is Albert Anastasia also known as the
“Mad Hatter” and “Lord High Executioner,” killed in 1957 in a barber shop because of an
internal war between Vito Genovese and Frank Costello. Social ties, in particular, family
ties between the boss and his aﬃliates are also likely to keep p and q high. Bosses with
larger families should therefore have more connections. Moreover, captains with family
ties might also have a lower intermediary cost τ. In the next Section we present the ﬁrst
empirical test of these hypotheses.
6 Which Characteristics Predict the Importance of
a Maﬁa Member?
The following analysis will try to highlight the forces that might inﬂuence p and q, and,
therefore, the number of connections mobsters have. Since the data do not allow us to
distinguish soldiers from captains, the equation that we estimate can be interpreted as
a linear approximation of c∗ + s∗. While for the sake of simplicity the model did not
take into account the quality of the links, in the previous Sections we saw that there are
several ways to measure how central, or how connected a member is within the network.
We start our regression analysis using the eigenvector index as dependent variable, as it
depends both on the number and the quality of its connections, on the whole sample of
23mobsters. But several of them are likely to be soldiers, and thus to be more coherent with
the theoretical model later we show how our results change when we restrict the analysis
to top mobsters.
6.1 Descriptive Evidence
Before moving to the regressions a graphical analysis can shed light on some organizational
rules of the Maﬁa. Figure 9 shows that all centrality measures grow steadily with age.
This ﬁnding conﬁrms Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972, pg.130)’s anthropologic results about
the importance of age in determining the leadership positions. Unlike typical income
proﬁles there is absolutely no evidence about a inverse U-shaped relationship between
centrality and age. The diﬀerence between the minimum age (23) and the maximum
age (60) doubles the degree, triplicates the eigenvector index, and more than triplicates
betweenness. Closeness, instead, shows a very steep increase up to age 30 and than ﬂattens
out, but the overall increase is more modest.
Figure 10 shows how the interaction index, our continuous proxy for “maﬁa culture”
inﬂuences centrality. The overall patterns are less clear than for age, but when interac-
tions are very high all centrality measures appear to increase as well. Figure 11 shows
that eigenvector centrality is low in the absence of daughters or sone, but that sons and
daughters seem to be equally valuable in increasing the father’s centrality. We will say
more about this later when we analyze the importance of intermarriage. Figure 12 shows
that the number of types of crimes and of businesses do also positively inﬂuence mobster’s
centrality within the network, especially up to the number 4. Above 4 types of crimes
allegedly committed the evidence is more noisy as there fewer observations are available.
We present how categorical variables inﬂuence network centrality in the next Section,
where we move to a regression framework.
246.2 The Eigenvalue Index
In Table 8 we use the eigenvector centrality measure as our dependent variable, though
more generally we assume the following linear relationship between the k-th index of
importance ck
i of individual i and his observable characteristics Xi: ck
i = β0Xi + ei,
k = 1,...,4.27
Each regression controls for the number of mobsters that in our data share the same
surname. We call this variable “Extended family members” despite the possibility that
some of these mobsters might not be related to each other. Given that our connections
are based on surnames we added this variable is to control for mechanical eﬀect that an
increasing number of mobsters might have on our centrality measures. The coeﬃcient is
always around 5, as 5 is also the number of associates contained in each criminal ﬁle.
In the ﬁrst column we regress the eigenvector index on individual characteristics that
are plausibly exogenous. Each additional year of age increases the index by 0.247 (2 per-
cent), which is a very large eﬀect and, as we mentioned, is consistent with Ianni and Reuss-Ianni
(1972)’s account of hierarchies based on generations. Another variable that has a signif-
icant positive inﬂuence on centrality (20 percent) is migrating from Sicily. Not only was
the US Maﬁa an Italian enterprise, it valued direct links with Sicilians more than with
people from other parts of Italy. Sicilian kin-centered social system, with its code of honor
and vow of silence, forms the building block for the Maﬁa. Bonanno would write that
among Italians he felt safe only around Sicilians. Moreover, nativity does not fully capture
adherence to the maﬁa code of law as 60 percent of the mobsters were born in the U.S.
But the interaction index, which depends on the geographical distribution of last names,
and proxies for community ties and exposure to the “Tradition,” has also a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on network centrality. Members from Sicily and those with stronger ties
to the Maﬁa culture could probably be trusted more, as they were more likely to adhere
27See Appendix for a detailed description of the diﬀerent indices.
25to the omert` a, increasing p and q. Height and weight of the mobster does not inﬂuence
his status.
In column 2 we control for the nuclear family structure of the mobster. Each additional
child increases the eigenvector index by one, while it doesn’t matter whether the child is
male or female. This ﬁnding challenges the criminological view that within the Maﬁa male
children are more valuable than female ones because they represents potential “workforce.”
Our leading explanation for this ﬁnding is that in a male only society like the Maﬁa
“connected” girls (probably in excess demand) could be married strategically.
The number of siblings, and being married or divorced does not inﬂuence the centrality
index. This is in line with Falcone and Padovani (1991, pg. 113)’s view that unlike the
Maﬁa in Italy the American Maﬁa adapted a more liberal view toward divorce.
Being married to a wife who is connected, instead, leads to an almost 50 percent
increase in the index. These ﬁndings, again, seem to suggest that higher p and q, due
to more trusted links, increase the optimal number of connections. We cannot rule out
the possibility that more connected mobsters are also more likely to ﬁnd, or be given,
a connected wife. While these alternative interpretations do not matter when the only
purpose is to discover the leading ﬁgures within the Maﬁa, one has to be careful in
giving a causal interpretation to these estimates. In the third column we control for the
known legal and illegal activities of the mobster. The leading mobsters are active in New
York (+37.5 percent) and New Jersey (+51 percent). Criminals who were known to have
committed violent crimes have an index that is 15 percent larger (+1.863). If being violent
reduces the risk of betrayal this ﬁnding is consistent with our model. An arrest increases
the importance by 2.6 (20 percent), though, again, higher ranked individuals might be
more likely to be arrested. Age at ﬁrst arrest is negative, showing that not only age, but
also experience increases the level of centrality in the network (young members are often
recruited in jail; Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972, pg. 45).
26The remaining two variables measure how many diﬀerent types of crime and diﬀerent
types of businesses the mobster was involved in. Both variables are positive. This is
consistent with more able criminals being more able to diversify risk. But the number of
business types (+16 percent) are a better predictor for “key players” than the number of
crime types (+4 percent). The last column combines all the regressions in one without
notable changes. The combined regressors explain almost 30 percent of the variability of
the eigenvector index.
6.3 Other Network Centrality Indices
Eigenvector centrality represents only one way to measure centrality in the network. Other
indices capture diﬀerent nuances of centrality. In Table 9 we look at diﬀerent measures of
centrality and importance using the same speciﬁcation used in the last column of Table 8.
In order to highlight how diﬀerent measures are able to capture diﬀerent characteristics
of the network, and since there is no systematic way to decompose the diﬀerent centrality
measures based on the importance of direct and indirect links, we developed a simple
statistical way to accomplish the same goal: we simply add as a dependent variable the
residual (￿
j
i) of a linear projection of the alternative measures of centrality (c
j




i = α + βc1
i + ￿
j
i ; j 6= 1.
The coeﬃcients on the residuals of a particular centrality index measure the nuances
captured by that particular index with respect to a simple count of direct connections.
Column 2 replicates the last column of Table 8 to eases the comparison with the other
measures. Comparing columns 1 and 2 shows that the coeﬃcients are not very diﬀerent
when degree is used to proxy for leadership. The only coeﬃcients that seem to be smaller
are the ones on residing in New York or New Jersey, and the one on the types of businesses.
Our simple test for the signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences that looks at the residuals conﬁrms
that these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant. This means that living in New York and New Jersey,
27and the number of businesses increase the eigenvector centrality not only through the
direct links but also through the indirect ones, while for all the other variables that are
signiﬁcant in column 2 but not in column 3 only direct links matter.
Closeness, an inverse measure of the average distance from the other members, and
betweenness, the ability to build bridges, capture diﬀerent aspects in the deﬁnition of
individual importance or power within a network. Column 4 shows that overall the
coeﬃcients for closeness do not diﬀer substantially from those seen before. The main
diﬀerence is that height reduces the average distance between members, while the types of
crime have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on how close a member is to the other mobsters. Closeness
is also more than any other index dependent on kinship. The “Sicily” coeﬃcient, the
interaction index coeﬃcient, and the “Connected” wife coeﬃcient are all highly signiﬁcant.
Moreover, column 5 shows that a large part of these eﬀects are driven by the indirect links
(cannot be explained by degree alone).
Results that use betweenness as a dependent variable shown in column 6 present
very interesting ﬁndings: there is no evidence that bridges are build through marriages.
The coeﬃcient on the Connected wife dummy is precisely estimated to be close to zero.
Strategic marriages are thus conﬁned to happen within “friendly” clans, and not across
clans that wouldn’t otherwise be connected. The number of diﬀerent crimes committed
have also no bridging capacity, while businesses do.
Experience and age, instead, inﬂuence betweenness beyond the increase in degree. And
so does being Sicilian, residing in New York or New Jersey, and being active in several
businesses.
6.4 Qualitative Measures of Importance
In column 2 of Table 10 we exploit qualitative information on the mobsters contained
in the records. In particular, we use the same speciﬁcation as before but the dependent
28variable counts the number of times the following words are used in describing a mobster:
“boss,” “highest,” “most,” “head,” ‘top,” “high,” “inﬂuential,” “important,” “leader,”
“leading,” “powerful,” and “representing.” Overall the results conﬁrm the importance
of directly migrating from Sicily, being old and experienced, residing in New Jersey or
New York, being active in many types of businesses, and using violence. But marrying a
connected wife, having many siblings, having strong community ties (interactions), and
the number of crimes committed are not anymore signiﬁcantly related to leadership. This
lack of signiﬁcance leads to a lower R-squared (8.2 versus 28.7 percent). While there
might be superior ways to extract the information know by the FBN (we did try several
qualitative measures), network based measures seem to capture additional attributes of
leadership.
6.5 Indegree, Random and Non-Random Truncation of the Sam-
ple
Table 11 shows two types of robustness checks. In the ﬁrst instead of using undirected
links we use only the indegree, meaning the number of times someone appears as an
associate in criminal proﬁles of other mobsters. Given that outdegree is bounded at 5
it is not surprising that the coeﬃcients are driven by indegree, and thus are very close
to the one that correspond to the undirected degree shown in the ﬁrst column of Table
9. The second and more important robustness check simulates random truncations of
our sample. Since our initial sample is likely to be truncated as well—some scholars
estimate that there as many as 5,000 “made” men across the U.S—, we try to address
the possible bias that such a truncation might generate. Columns 3 and 4 show the mean
and the median coeﬃcients obtained in regressions based on 500 diﬀerent samples where
we randomly truncated 50 percent of the observations. Indegree is based on 50 percent
of the sample only and, as before, standardized to lie between 0 and 100. There is no
29evidence that randomly truncating the sample biases the coeﬃcients.
Our sample, though, is certainly a non-random sample of mobsters. Those with more
connections and more power are certainly more likely to be noticed by law enforcement
agents. To address the eﬀect of non-random truncation in Table 10 we separate the
sample depending on whether the eigenvector index is above or below median. The
theoretical model refers to leaders who select their crew. The determinants that we
argued inﬂuenced p and q should, therefore, be stronger predictor of leadership among
the top-ranked mobsters than among the lower-ranked ones. In column 3 and 4 we split
the sample into mobsters that are above or below the median eigenvector index. Violence,
types of legal and illegal activities, a connected wife, more family members are indeed
strong predictors of leadership only among the top leaders. And, while not signiﬁcant,
the coeﬃcients on year of birth, interaction index, and number of children are large for
top leaders and close to zero otherwise. The only seemingly puzzling result is the lack
of signiﬁcance for being born in Sicily. But only 76 out of 229 Sicilians are lower-ranked
mobsters. The likelihood of being top-ranked is 67 percent for Sicilians and only 43
percent for non-Sicilians. Sicilian mobsters are more likely to be in the upper distribution
of leadership, but once there they are above the median, they are not more likely to be
on top. For lower-ranked criminals, instead, residing in New Jersey or New York allows
them to establish more connections, and so does jail time. All the other coeﬃcients are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper presents the ﬁrst thorough micro-level analysis of the US Maﬁa network.
Beside testing sociological and historical views about the functioning of these criminal
networks, we develop a simple model of connections that highlights the trade-oﬀ of con-
nections: they increase proﬁts and power but also the risk of detection. More connections
30mean more potential informers. Family ties, violence, and exposure to Maﬁa culture
reduce the probability of defection and increase the number of connections. Unlike eco-
nomic organizations hierarchies depend crucially on kinship. Our results highlight how
intermarriage shapes the network. Women are used to foster the Family’s network central-
ity, but only within trusted Families. Woman are not used to bridge Families that are not
otherwise closely connected. Trust shapes the network. Where values are shared and the
maﬁa culture is strong connections are more stable and thus more numerous. Coherent
with maﬁa culture, how central members are within the network increases steadily with
age. And more central members are going to have more businesses, legal and illegal ones.
Mathematical modeling necessary to tie explicit social network structure back to the
diﬀusion of economic behavior is expanding at a radical pace. Empirical evidence on
observed social network phenomena can thus be helpful to inform such a modeling. But
empirical evidence has also an important value per se, for policy purposes. If social
connections are the driving forces of the phenomenon under consideration and if their
structure is non-random, as in our case, a detailed study of the characteristics of the
network might reveal some relevant features of social structure that can guide crime
preventing policies. A targeted policy identifying “key players” in a given area may be
an eﬀective way to reduce crime (Ballester et al., 2006). A key player is an individual
belonging to a network of criminals who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate
delinquency reduction. In practice, the planner may want to identify optimal network
targets to concentrate (scarce) investigatory resources on some particular individuals,
or to isolate them from the rest of the group, either through leniency programs, social
assistance programs, or incarceration. The success of such policies depends on the ability
to identify a social network structure. Only detailed empirical studies on real-world social
networks can provide guidance in this direction.
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Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of agents in network g. Let us deﬁne G the n−square
adjacency matrix of he network g , i.e. the matrix that keeps track of the direct connec-
tions in this network, where gij = 1 if i and j are directly linked, and gij = 0, otherwise.28
The simplest index of connectivity is the number of direct links stemming from each







The deﬁnition of centrality is thus based on the number of direct links only. A variant of
28Measurement errors in the deﬁnition of the actual connections are clearly unavoidable in our study.
Some names are blanked out and many lower-ranked maﬁosi were not ﬁled.










where λ is the highest eigenvalue of matrix G. The formula implies (recursively) that
the centrality of individual i is proportional to the sum of centralities of the individuals
she/he is connected to. It thus can be high even if she/he has low degree.







where dij is the geodesic distance (length of the shortest path) between individuals i
and j.29 As a result, the closeness centrality of individual i is the inverse of the sum of
geodesic distances from i to the n−1 other individuals and can be regarded as a measure
of how long it will take information to spread from a given member to other members in
the network.
Betweenness indexes derive from the number of optimal paths across (or from) every








where j and l denote two given agents in g, ajl,i is the number of shortest paths between
j and l through i, and ajl is the number of shortest paths between j and l.
29The length of a shortest path is the smallest k such that there is at least one path of length k from i
to j. We can identify such a length by computing G, G2, G3, ..., until we ﬁnd the ﬁrst k such that the
(i,j)th entry of Gk is not zero.
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Figure 3: Violent and Non-Violent Crime Rates by Maﬁa Density
Notes: Maﬁa structure is equal to the average eigenvector index. Violent (murder,
rape, robbery, and assault) and non-violent (burglary, larceny, and auto theft)
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Figure 4: Violent and Non-Violent Crimes Rate Residuals by Maﬁa
Density
Notes: Maﬁa structure is equal to the average eigenvector index. Violent (murder,
rape, robbery, and assault) and non-violent (burglary, larceny, and auto theft)
crime rates are based on uniform crime reports. The city ﬁxed eﬀects are based on
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Figure 6: Geographical Distribution of Maﬁa Surnames.
Notes: Each circle represents a zip code. The size of the circles is proportional to
the number of US Maﬁamembers’ surnames found in today’s Italian phone
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Figure 9: Centrality and Age
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Figure 10: Centrality and “Tradition”
Notes: The ﬁgures show Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression and the corresponding 95 percent
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Figure 11: Centrality, Sons and Daughters
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Figure 12: Centrality, Types of Crimes and of Businesses
Notes: Each line represent the 40-60 percentile range.
48Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Cities with the Maﬁa
Violent crimes 1489.415 699.841 410
Murders 24.941 12.136 410
Rapes 73.215 29.544 410
Robberies 767.827 377.486 410
Assaults 642.239 394.551 410
Cities without the Maﬁa
Violent crimes 1015.653 626.481 932
Murders 16.041 11.19 932
Rapes 66.253 31.78 932
Robberies 464.084 338.572 932
Assaults 469.275 318.857 932
Notes: Violent (murder, rape, robbery, and assault)
crime rates are based on uniform crime reports
between 1970 and 1992. Cities with the Maﬁa are
cities where Families seemed to be active in 1960
according to our criminal records.
49Table 2: Summary Statistics of Individual Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Person
Born in the U.S. 0.59 0.49 0 1 801
Born in Italy (except Sicily) 0.1 0.3 0 1 801
Born in Sicily 0.29 0.45 0 1 801
Year of birth 1911.48 7.66 1900 1937 623
Height in feet 5.61 0.2 5 6.25 790
Weight in pounds 176.24 26.63 95 365 789
Family
Married 0.75 0.43 0 1 801
Divorced 0.07 0.25 0 1 801
Connected wife 0.18 0.38 0 1 801
Number of children 1.01 1.44 0 8 801
Fraction of daughters 0.49 0.37 0 1 351
Siblings 1.96 2.1 0 11 801
Extended family members 1.62 1.04 1 6 801
Activities
Resides in NY 0.43 0.49 0 1 801
Resides in NJ 0.07 0.25 0 1 801
Violent crimes 0.63 0.48 0 1 801
Age at ﬁrst arrest 23.19 7.59 6 57 521
Never arrested 0.16 0.37 0 1 801
Types of crime committed 2.58 1.7 0 9 801
Types of businesses 1.07 0.98 0 5 801
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Legal Businesses
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Drugstores 0.27 0.46 0 2
Restaurants 0.18 0.38 0 1
Food companies 0.09 0.28 0 1
Manual laborer 0.07 0.26 0 1
Casinos 0.07 0.25 0 1
Real estate 0.05 0.23 0 1
Import export 0.05 0.22 0 1
Car dealer 0.05 0.22 0 1
N 801
50Table 4: Summary Statistics of Crimes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Drug oﬀenses 0.43 0.5 0 1
Robbery 0.26 0.44 0 1
Murder 0.23 0.42 0 1
Weapon oﬀenses 0.22 0.42 0 1
Simple assault 0.21 0.41 0 1
Larceny 0.20 0.4 0 1
Burglary 0.13 0.34 0 1
Gambling 0.13 0.33 0 1
Liquor oﬀenses 0.13 0.34 0 1
Extortion 0.07 0.25 0 1
Counterfeiting 0.07 0.25 0 1
N 801
51Table 5: List of Criminals with the Highest and the Lowest Degree
Lastname Name Degree Top High Apalachin Rank (Family)
Criminals with the highest 15 degrees
Lucania Salvatore 71 1 1 0 Boss
Ormento John 71 0 2 1 Caporegime (Lucchese)
Accardo Settimo 64 1 2 0 Caporegime (Lucchese)
Accardo Antonio 64 0 1 0 Boss
Genovese Vito 55 1 0 1 Underboss (Luciano) later Boss
Genovese Michael 55 0 1 1 Boss
Coppola Michael 54 2 1 0 Caporegime (Genovese)
Coppola Frank 54 0 5 0 Deported to Italy
Coppola Stephen 54 0 1 0 Soldier (Maggadino)
Strollo Antonio 47 2 2 0 Caporegime (Genovese)
Profaci Frank 44 1 1 0 Boss
Profaci Joseph 44 1 2 1 Boss (son of Frank)
Santoro Salvatore 42 0 0 0 Underboss (Lucchese)
Vitale Vito 40 1 1 0 Boss in Sicily
Vitale Salvatore 40 1 0 0 Underboss (Bonanno)
Criminals with the lowest 15 degrees
Castorina Vincent 1 0 0 0
Kornhauser Max 1 0 2 0
Bibbo Nicholas 1 0 0 0
Virusso Santo 1 0 1 0
Mandala Nicholas 1 0 0 0
Roberto Dominick 1 0 1 0
Simoni Pierre 1 0 0 0
Candelmo John 1 0 1 0
Colombo Frank 1 0 0 0
Bongiorno Frank 1 0 1 0
Amari Philip 1 0 1 0
Peloso Antonio 1 0 0 0
Labarbara Joseph 1 0 0 0
Pine Grace 1 1 1 0
Valle Alarico 1 1 0 0
52Table 6: Summary Statistics of Network-related Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Measures of Centrality
Degree 11.13 9.55 1 71
Degree (std.) 15.67 13.45 1.41 100
Centrality (std.) 12.59 14.16 0.01 100
Closeness (std.) 72.74 8.76 42.57 100
Betweenness (std.) 5.09 9.47 0 100
Top ranked 0.55 0.5 0 1
Top rank citations 0.85 1.02 0 7
Exposure to Tradition
Interaction index 3.7 7.52 0 65.40
N 801
Table 7: Positive Assortativity Among Crime and Business Types
Crimes Businesses
b β SD(b β) b β SD(b β)
Murder 0.440 0.083 Restaurants 0.158 0.095
Robbery 0.478 0.091 Drugstores 0.184 0.098
Simple assault 0.339 0.087 Food companies 0.447 0.111
Burglary 0.232 0.099 Real estate 0.310 0.134
Larceny 0.068 0.094 Import export 0.403 0.155
Counterfeiting 0.361 0.148 Manual laborer 0.215 0.129
Drug oﬀenses 0.939 0.053 Casinos 0.348 0.111
Gambling 0.608 0.117
Liquor oﬀenses -0.001 0.072
Weapons oﬀenses 0.160 0.086
Extortion 0.403 0.135
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients and clustered standard errors by surnames from a
regression of crime type dummies on the fraction of associates who perpetrated the
same crime type. We restrict the data to businesses held and crimes perpetrated
by at least ﬁve percent of the sample.
53Table 8: The Determinants of the Eigenvector Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eigenvalue index
Extended family members 4.726*** 5.539*** 5.791*** 5.026***
(0.908) (0.859) (0.831) (0.785)
Born in Italy (except Sicily) -0.583 0.091
(1.622) (1.571)
Born in Sicily 2.282* 3.156**
(1.284) (1.222)
Year of birth -0.247*** -0.228***
(0.064) (0.066)
Interaction index 2.409* 2.407*
(1.409) (1.310)
Height in feet 2.697 2.704
(2.657) (2.506)






Connected wife 5.796*** 4.711***
(1.602) (1.518)
Number of children 1.025*** 0.622*
(0.365) (0.349)




Resides in NY 4.567*** 4.842***
(1.070) (1.059)
Resides in NJ 6.200*** 5.965***
(2.118) (2.012)
Violent crimes 1.863** 1.426
(0.901) (0.927)
Age at ﬁrst arrest -0.079* -0.056
(0.042) (0.058)
Never arrested -2.624* -2.222
(1.346) (1.828)
Types of crime committed 0.563* 0.676**
(0.295) (0.318)
Types of businesses 1.981*** 1.818***
(0.541) (0.530)
Observations 801 801 801 801
R-squared 0.200 0.204 0.226 0.287
Notes: The regressions include also missing dummies for year of birth, height,
and weight. Clustered (by family) standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
54Table 9: The Determinants of Importance Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Eigenvalue Closeness Betweenness
Degree Total Residual Total Residual Total Residual
Ext. family members 5.495*** 5.026*** -0.121 3.704*** 2.871*** 0.913*** -0.009
(0.876) (0.785) (0.489) (0.416) (0.598) (0.319) (0.036)
Born in Italy (ex. Sicily) -0.576 0.091 0.630 -0.190 -0.216 0.102 0.133
(1.463) (1.571) (0.771) (1.017) (0.849) (0.803) (0.134)
Born in Sicily 2.193* 3.156** 1.102* 2.678*** 1.441* 1.565*** 0.174*
(1.159) (1.222) (0.660) (0.751) (0.792) (0.537) (0.102)
Year of birth -0.224*** -0.228*** -0.019 -0.177*** -0.132*** -0.063** -0.018***
(0.062) (0.066) (0.036) (0.039) (0.048) (0.030) (0.005)
Interaction index 2.751** 2.407* -0.170 1.431*** 3.495*** 0.034 -0.055
(1.270) (1.310) (0.806) (0.512) (0.847) (0.473) (0.055)
Height in feet 3.648 2.704 -0.714 3.316** 1.559 1.463 -0.037
(2.368) (2.506) (1.258) (1.563) (1.678) (1.063) (0.205)
Weight in pounds 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.001
(0.018) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.001)
Married -0.122 -0.691 -0.577 0.339 -0.538 0.401 0.049
(1.102) (1.160) (0.557) (0.694) (0.810) (0.509) (0.094)
Divorced -0.247 -0.004 0.227 0.094 0.775 0.220 0.124
(2.000) (2.132) (0.978) (1.408) (1.441) (0.959) (0.151)
Connected wife 4.422*** 4.711*** 0.569 1.858** 1.845** -0.388 0.092
(1.391) (1.518) (0.737) (0.744) (0.924) (0.537) (0.104)
Number of children 0.580* 0.622* 0.078 0.319* 0.389 0.025 -0.001
(0.332) (0.349) (0.174) (0.190) (0.263) (0.137) (0.028)
Fraction of daughters 0.734 1.846 1.159 0.755 -0.084 0.382 0.169
(1.580) (1.923) (0.984) (0.997) (1.055) (0.723) (0.139)
Siblings 0.181 -0.006 -0.176 0.175 0.250* 0.083 0.038**
(0.195) (0.219) (0.112) (0.126) (0.133) (0.090) (0.020)
Resides in NY 2.284** 4.842*** 2.703*** 4.336*** 0.239 3.176*** 0.195**
(0.892) (1.059) (0.628) (0.596) (0.575) (0.418) (0.084)
Resides in NJ 3.139 5.965*** 3.025*** 5.783*** 2.644 4.189*** 0.364**
(2.087) (2.012) (0.881) (1.090) (1.735) (0.819) (0.179)
Violent crimes 0.577 1.426 0.886* 0.268 0.426 -0.025 0.065
(0.854) (0.927) (0.514) (0.541) (0.621) (0.410) (0.081)
Age at ﬁrst arrest -0.045 -0.056 -0.014 -0.065 -0.030 -0.042 -0.011**
(0.051) (0.058) (0.035) (0.041) (0.029) (0.031) (0.005)
Never arrested -2.239 -2.222 -0.124 -1.971* -1.322 -0.834 -0.219
(1.628) (1.828) (1.067) (1.187) (1.033) (0.862) (0.150)
Types of crime committed 0.572** 0.676** 0.140 0.187 0.206 -0.103 -0.004
(0.288) (0.318) (0.158) (0.209) (0.177) (0.137) (0.026)
Types of businesses 1.346*** 1.818*** 0.558** 1.051*** 0.765** 0.368* 0.088**
(0.479) (0.530) (0.232) (0.292) (0.332) (0.201) (0.040)
Observations 801 801 801 801 801 801 801
R-squared 0.322 0.287 0.069 0.370 0.266 0.134 0.082
Notes: The regressions include also missing dummies for year of birth, height, and weight. The leader
variable counts the number of words that describe mobsters as leaders. Clustered (by family) standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
55Table 10: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eigenvalue
Eigenvalue Leadership Above median Below median
Extended family members 5.026*** -0.009 3.147*** 0.447
(0.785) (0.036) (0.845) (0.426)
Born in Italy (except Sicily) 0.091 0.133 -2.989 0.260
(1.571) (0.134) (3.038) (0.418)
Born in Sicily 3.156** 0.174* -0.229 -0.099
(1.222) (0.102) (1.858) (0.312)
Year of birth -0.228*** -0.018*** -0.163 -0.021
(0.066) (0.005) (0.115) (0.016)
Interaction index 2.407* -0.055 2.203 0.630
(1.310) (0.055) (1.408) (0.451)
Height in feet 2.704 -0.037 0.123 0.797
(2.506) (0.205) (3.969) (0.601)
Weight in pounds -0.002 0.001 -0.015 0.005
(0.017) (0.001) (0.038) (0.005)
Married -0.691 0.049 -2.699 0.184
(1.160) (0.094) (2.284) (0.261)
Divorced -0.004 0.124 -0.537 -0.333
(2.132) (0.151) (3.927) (0.484)
Connected wife 4.711*** 0.092 6.958*** 0.443
(1.518) (0.104) (2.195) (0.313)
Number of children 0.622* -0.001 0.633 0.014
(0.349) (0.028) (0.509) (0.079)
Fraction of daughters 1.846 0.169 2.108 0.370
(1.923) (0.139) (3.129) (0.414)
Siblings -0.006 0.038** -0.045 0.021
(0.219) (0.020) (0.325) (0.059)
Resides in NY 4.842*** 0.195** 3.672** 0.561**
(1.059) (0.084) (1.788) (0.268)
Resides in NJ 5.965*** 0.364** 3.716 1.852***
(2.012) (0.179) (2.970) (0.494)
Violent crimes 1.426 0.065 3.524** -0.025
(0.927) (0.081) (1.568) (0.223)
Age at ﬁrst arrest -0.056 -0.011** 0.020 -0.020
(0.058) (0.005) (0.097) (0.016)
Never arrested -2.222 -0.219 -2.979 -0.960**
(1.828) (0.150) (2.882) (0.448)
Types of crime committed 0.676** -0.004 1.058** -0.032
(0.318) (0.026) (0.484) (0.078)
Types of businesses 1.818*** 0.088** 2.256*** -0.009
(0.530) (0.040) (0.858) (0.114)
Observations 801 801 401 400
R-squared 0.287 0.082 0.195 0.114
Notes: The dependent variable “Leadership” counts the number of times the words “boss,”
“highest,” “most,” “head,” ‘top,” “high,” “inﬂuential,” “important,” “leader,” “leading,”
“powerful,” and “representing” are cited. The regressions include also missing dummies for
year of birth, height, and weight. Clustered (by family) standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
56Table 11: Regressions of Indegree with Random Trun-
cation of Half of the Sample
β se(β) simulated β
average median
Extended family members 5.47 0.87 5.97 5.83
Born in Italy (except Sicily) -0.49 1.45 -0.61 -0.66
Born in Sicily 2.15 1.15 2.14 2.24
Year of birth -0.22 0.06 -0.23 -0.23
Interaction index 2.80 1.26 3.23 2.93
Height in feet 3.66 2.36 3.60 3.89
Weight in pounds 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Married -0.10 1.10 -0.05 -0.13
Divorced -0.22 1.99 -0.21 -0.25
Connected wife 4.28 1.37 4.59 4.43
Number of children 0.57 0.33 0.60 0.59
Fraction of daughters 0.64 1.57 0.72 0.79
Siblings 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19
Resides in NY 2.24 0.88 2.47 2.40
Resides in NJ 3.02 2.06 3.15 3.08
Violent crimes 0.54 0.84 0.55 0.48
Age at ﬁrst arrest -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Never arrested -2.18 1.63 -2.23 -2.12
Types of crimes committed 0.56 0.29 0.57 0.57
Types of businesses 1.30 0.47 1.36 1.38
Notes: The ﬁrst two columns show the coeﬃcients and the
standard errors based on the whole sample. Columns 3 and 4
show the mean and the median coeﬃcients of 500 regressions
based on randomly truncated samples.
57